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Military power is central to diplomacy and much of international relations, yet common quantitative measures have limited surface validity. This limitation stems from focusing on latent power and only indirectly incorporating major weapon systems. I contend that weapons are central to military power and present a new measure of country military power based primarily on armaments. The measure includes major naval, air and land weapons as well as nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capability. I examine the surface, content and context validity of the measure and compare it to existing measures. I show that this measure of material military power (MMP) has more surface and context validity than alternative measures. I find that MMP better predicts war outcomes, better accounts for militarized threats, and performs well as a control variable for country power.

Military power is central to diplomacy and much of international relations, yet common quantitative measures have limited surface validity. This limitation stems from focusing on latent power and only indirectly incorporating major weapon systems. I contend that weapons are central to military power and present a new measure of country military power based primarily on armaments. The measure includes major naval, air and land weapons as well as nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capability. I examine the surface, content and context validity of the measure and compare it to existing measures. I show that this measure of material military power (MMP) has more surface and context validity than alternative measures. I find that MMP better predicts war outcomes, better accounts for militarized threats, and performs well as a control variable for country power.

"Power Shifts and War" published on by Oxford University Press.

How should educators teach students to make better theoretical
arguments, that is, an argument that is logical and fruitful?
Logical thinking is about making valid deductions from a set of
premises and avoiding fallacies. Fruitful thinking involves making
an argument that fits reality. Theoretical thinking, then,
emphasizes building a sound argument with relevant
and interesting empirical implications. In this way, theoretical
thinking complements the more common educational mantra of teaching
students to think critically, which tends to focus on the detection
of fallacies or other flaws in an argument. Emphasizing detection
instead of construction, however, limits the development of
analytical and independent thinking. To better teach the range of
thinking skills most educators want their students to acquire calls
for a focus on the understanding and construction of theoretical
arguments, and this calls for greater emphasis on learning at least
a basic system of logic. I thank Eric
Hoffmann, Bob Jackson, Will Moore, Jeff Staton, and the
reviewers for many helpful comments on earlier drafts. All
remaining errors are my responsibility.

Systemic realist arguments of foreign policy decision-making suggest that partisan disagreement stops at the water's edge. A domestic-politics model of foreign policy decision-making posits that politics does not stop at the water's edge. Extant research on foreign policy voting in the U.S. Congress is consistent with the systemic realist argument. According to this research, partisan voting is less likely to occur on national security, or high-politics issues, than on low-politics issues. I argue that this research suffers from two flaws. First, it does not measure high-politics in accordance with systemic realist thinking. Second, the goal in addressing the water's-edge question is not to learn if a specific variable, such as high-politics, is significant, but to compare competing models. To this end, it is necessary to engage in a "three-cornered fight" and conduct a nonnested model discrimination test. After creating a new measure of high-politics, I compare a systemic realist model against a domestic-politics model of foreign policy voting in the House of Representatives from 1953—2000. The model discrimination test indicates that the domestic-politics model outperforms the systemic realist model. Institutional dynamics and public opinion are more important for understanding foreign policy voting than are more traditional realist variables.

Air superiority enhances military firepower and maneuverability and is critical to battlefield success. We offer the first quantitative test of the relationship between air superiority and battlefield outcomes. To conduct the test, we created a data set of which side, if any, achieved air superiority in the decisive battle of conventional wars between 1932 and 2003. We found that air superiority significantly improved a country's probability of winning the decisive battle as well as the overall war. Further, we found that air superiority was a better predictor of winning a war than other well-known factors such as adoption of the modern system, regime type, civil–military relations, and a general measure of military power.

Extant research has not produced consistent findings on the relationship between domestic political problems and the use of force abroad. We argue that this ambiguity results from incomplete theorizing and flawed empirical tests. We advance the understanding of diversionary uses of force by highlighting the political bias that domestic problems create for a leader and how this political bias interacts with the power relationship between diverters and potential targets. This conceptual discussion clarifies the political incentives each actor has to engage in military conflict and leads to a novel hypothesis. For example, domestic problems increase the probability that a weak state will attack a strong state, but domestic problems will have little effect on changing the probability of conflict between strong and weak. Empirical tests of the hypotheses for the period 1946–2000 are consistent with the argument.

Leaders who can accumulate audience costs can send costly signals that may help alleviate information problems associated with crisis escalation. We argue that research examining the effect of audience costs fails to appreciate the theoretical context in which audience costs matter. Audience costs may help alleviate information problems associated with international conflict. However, credible commitment problems are more central than information problems for some international conflicts. Theory does not expect audience costs to matter in this context; as a result, extant tests, and many criticisms, of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation are flawed. We offer a more appropriate test of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation. Consistent with extant theoretical arguments, we find that audience costs only reduce the likelihood of conflict when credible commitment problems are not the dominant concern motivating a dispute or crisis.